Iran-Watch.com prepared its first op-ed (with this identical title) predicting Muqtada al- Sadr would be Iraq’s next Prime Minister, on 28 November 06. Since then, Sadr’s chances have improved. In fact, President Bush’s surge strategy has only one assured outcome – Bush will discredit the Kurds, the Sunnis, Maliki and Hakim as pro-Iran Quislings and propel Sadr into the leadership of Iraq’s government.
In a recent assessment of political realties in Iraq, Stan Goff sets out the case for Sadr’s supremacy.
First, three million Shia reside in Sadr City, only three kilometers from the Green Zone. Does the US believe this force can be stopped in Baghdad using an acceptable level of US military power? Does the US intend to apprehend Sadr and ship him to Guatanamo? This is the only way to prevent Sadr from becoming Prime Minister.
Second, the US’s preferred partner in Iraq, which is pro-Iran, thanks to Ambassador Khalilzad, and is Iran’s subsidiary political party SCIRI (the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), is far inferior to Sadr. SCIRI has no military base in Iraq. SCIRI has an office in Kurdistan, and a military presence only along the southern Iraq-Iran border. In other words, a US-SCIRI military coalition is still inferior to the Mahdi Army.
Third, thanks to Sadr’s political skills, the balance of forces inside Iraq has turned decisively in Sadr’s favor in the past year (see Stan Goff, Atlantic Free Press, 6 January 2007). In this context, a military push by President Bush will backfire by discrediting US allies like SCIRI and strengthening Sadr’s already commanding position.
Fourth, I would add that the balance of forces in the region, thanks to Assad and Putin, has also turned decisively in Sadr’s favor. See the upcoming op-ed “Syria and the US swap sides on Iran,” Iran-Watch.com).
In short, Muqtada al-Sadr will be propelled into power as Iraq’s next Prime Minister by President Bush’s plan “The New Way Forward.” Iran will be the big loser as Hakim and the SCIRI are driven to the sidelines. This is precisely the opposite result desired by President Bush, but it is the one he will get.
Unionists (Sadr) to Prevail in Iraq
by Scott Sullivan
January 04, 2007 01:00 PM EST
Winston Churchill’s enduring legacy in the Middle East has been the creation of the centralized and multi-ethnic state of Iraq, with its capital at Baghdad. The US overthrow of Saddam Hussein, however, calls Churchill’s legacy into question.
The basic issue underlying the future of Iraq is whether Iraq will be a single union ruled primarily from Baghdad or a more or less voluntary confederation of independent states. In this sense, Iraq is now deciding on the same issue that divided the United States in the mid-19th century. As in the United States, Iraq’s Unionists are likely to prevail, for several reasons.
First, the balance of forces in Iraq’s internal politics follows Iraqi public opinion and is in favor of the Union. Aside from the Kurds, only the Shi’ite SCIRI Party (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), directed by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, favors the Iraqi Confederacy. The SCIRI position, however, does not even gain majority Shi’ite support, much less support from Iraq’s Sunnis.
Moreover, SCIRI’s reputation is suspect because it is funded directly from Iran, which wants to annex Basra and Southern Iraq. As a consequence, Iraqi support for SCIRI’s pro-partition stance is likely to drop as awareness grows of the Iran-SCIRI connection.
Finally, SCIRI and Iran would face armed resistance from other Iraqi Shi’ites, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, if they attempt to separate a Shi’ite state from the rest of Iraq. President Ahmadinejad, at the end of the day, would be forced to send Iranian troops into Iraq to take Basra from Muqtada al-Sadr. Ahmadinejad will think long and hard before he confronts Muqtada al-Sadr on this issue.
Second, a negotiated outcome is unlikely to succeed in dividing Iraq and its assets between Iraq’s three main ethnic groups, the Shi’ites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds. Iraqi negotiators would face intractable problems such as deciding on the future of Kirkuk between ownership claims by the Kurds and the Sunnis. In fact, the Iraqi Kurdish issue is a show stopper in general for all negotiations on a future partition of Iraq, both with regard to Iraqi domestic issues as well as Iraq’s relations with Turkey, Syria, and Iran. All three states face their own Kurdish separatist threat that would be substantially strengthened by self-determination for the Iraqi Kurds.
Third, just as negotiations for a three-way partition of Iraq would fail to resolve the issues, so would military conflict. Iraqi stability would come only with a decisive military win by one side over the others, as with the triumph of the Unionists over the Confederacy in the US Civil War. In Iraq, no one side is likely to prevail, given the military parity of the three sides. As a result, Iraq’s civil war would never end but would be perpetuated indefinitely, much as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is today.
An Iraq scenario of perpetual warfare is also likely because of the involvement of Iraq’s neighbors in the conflict. Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Saudi Arabia would be reluctant to see their faction lose in the struggle for Iraq and its oil, and would fuel Iraq’s conflict indefinitely with various forms of assistance.
Fourth, Iraq’s partition via conflict would create a massive flow of refugees. The US will be unwilling to take on the task of managing Iraq’s refugee flows, to say the least, and for this reason alone will inevitably pull back from endorsement of any Iraq partition plan.
It would appear that either negotiations or military conflict will fail to solve the many problems associated with a three way partition of Iraq. What, then, is the likely alternative for Iraq?
The preferred alternative for the vast majority of Iraqis and all of Iraq’s neighbors, with the single exception of Iran, is acceptance of the status quo in Iraq, i.e., the perpetuation of the Iraqi Union and centralized rule from Baghdad. Iran could object to the Iraqi Union, and maintain support for the SCIRI and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim with his Iraq partition plan, but Iran would not carry Iraqi public opinion or any of Iraq’s neighbors as an ally.
Finally, the Kurds could also object to perpetuating the Iraqi Union, but are unlikely to carry support even from Iran. If Iran chooses to support the Kurds, Iran would face immediate diplomatic isolation in the region. In short, it would appear as though Winston Churchill’s legacy in the Middle East, a unified, multi-ethnic Iraqi state, will continue to be secure.
Mahdi Army expressing siege mentality
By STEVEN R. HURST, Associated Press Writer 45 minutes ago
Two Shiite militia commanders said Thursday that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has stopped protecting radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Madhi Army under pressure from Washington, while the fighters described themselves as under seige in their Sadr City stronghold.
Their account of an organization now fighting for its very existence could represent a tactical and propaganda feint, but there was mounting evidence the militia is increasingly off balance and has ordered its gunmen to melt back into the population. To avoid capture, commanders report no longer using cell phones and fighters are removing their black uniforms and hiding their weapons during the day.
During much of his nearly eight months in office, al-Maliki, who relies on al-Sadr's political backing, has blocked or ordered an end to many U.S.-led operations against the Mahdi Army.
As recently as Oct. 31, al-Maliki, trying to capitalize on American voter discontent with the war and White House reluctance to open a public fight with the Iraqi leader just before the election, won U.S. agreement to lift military blockades on Sadr City and another Shiite enclave where an American soldier was abducted.
But al-Maliki reportedly had a change of heart in late November while going into a meeting in Jordan with President Bush. It has since been disclosed that the Iraqi leader's vision for a new security plan for Baghdad, to which Bush has committed 17,500 additional U.S. troops, was outlined in that meeting.
Al-Maliki is said by aides to have told Bush that he wanted the Iraqi army and police to be in the lead, but he would no longer interfere to prevent U.S. attempts to roll up the Mahdi Army.
In a meeting before his session with Bush, Jordan's King Abdullah II was said by al-Maliki confidants to have conveyed the increasing anger of fellow Sunni leaders in the Middle East over the continuing slaughter of Sunni Muslims at the hands of Shiite death squads.
The midlevel Mahdi Army commanders, who spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity because the group operates in secret, said at least five top commanders of similar standing were captured or killed in recent months, including one snatched in a night raid from his Sadr City hide-out on Tuesday. They refused to name him.
Two other key officials at the top of the organization were killed in raids last month:
• Sahib al-Amiri, a senior al-Sadr military aide, was slain by American forces in the Shiite holy city of Najaf on Dec. 27. The U.S. military reported his death, calling him a criminal involved roadside bombings. Al-Sadr lives in Najaf.
• The other top commander, identified by a third Mahdi Army commander as Abu al-Sudour, was shot to death in a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid last month as well. He was hunted down in Sadr City.
The third commander, who also spoke anonymously to protect his identity, said U.S.-led raiding parties were now also engaged in massive sweeps, having rounded up what he said was every male old enough to carry a gun in south Baghdad's Um al-Maalef neighborhood Tuesday night.
One of the Mahdi Army commanders who spoke with the AP said the early warning was not ignored.
"Our top leadership has told us to lay low and not confront the Americans. But if Sadr City is attacked, if civilians are hurt, we will ignore those orders and take matters in our own hands. We won't need orders from Sheik Muqtada (al-Sadr)," the midlevel commander said.
Others in the organization said street fighters have been told not to wear their black uniforms and to hide their weapons, to make their checkpoints less visible. Reports from the growing number of neighborhoods controlled by the militias indicate fighters are obeying.
"We're no longer using cell phones except in emergencies. Some of our top commanders have not been home (in Sadr City) for a year because they fear capture," one of the commanders said.
The militiamen said al-Sadr himself had apparently gotten wind of the coming assault and ordered a reshuffling of the Mahdi Army command structure, transferring many leaders to new districts and firing others who were of suspect loyalty.
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